Trusted security zone access to peripheral devices

ABSTRACT

A method of trusted data communication. The method comprises executing a data communication application in a trusted security zone of a processor, wherein the processor is a component of a computer, commanding a controller of a peripheral device to execute a control application in a trusted security zone of the controller, wherein the controller is a component of the computer, commanding at least one of another peripheral device or a user interface device to not access a data bus of the computer, verifying that the controller is executing the control application in the trusted security zone of the controller, sending data from the processor to the controller over the data bus of the computer, and the controller one of transmitting the data sent by the processor on an external communication link, reading a memory storage disk, or writing to a memory storage disk.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

None.

STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT

Not applicable.

REFERENCE TO A MICROFICHE APPENDIX

Not applicable.

BACKGROUND

Computing platforms abound in daily life. We use sophisticated logicprocessors that execute complicated software and/or firmware to performa wide variety of activities. Increasingly, confidential information isbeing stored, manipulated, and/or communicated by these computingplatforms. Examples of such confidential information comprises socialsecurity numbers, credit card numbers, authentication numbers, financialaccounts, education related passwords, medical records, medicaldiagnostic information, contact information, confidential documents, andother sensitive information. Because more and more sensitive informationis present in these computing platforms, the rewards for hacking thesecurity of these computing platforms to access the information areincreasing.

SUMMARY

In an embodiment, a method of trusted data communication is disclosed.The method comprises executing a data communication application in atrusted security zone of a processor, wherein the processor is acomponent of a computer and commanding a controller of a firstperipheral device to execute a control application in a trusted securityzone of the controller, wherein the controller of the first peripheraldevice is a component of the computer. The method further comprisescommanding at least one of another peripheral device or a user interfacedevice to not access a data bus of the computer and verifying that thecontroller of the first peripheral device is executing the controlapplication in the trusted security zone of the controller. The methodfurther comprises, after verifying that the controller of the firstperipheral device is executing the control application in the trustedsecurity zone of the controller, sending data from the processor to thecontroller of the first peripheral device over the data bus of thecomputer, and the controller of the first peripheral device one oftransmitting the data sent by the processor on an external communicationlink, reading a memory storage disk, or writing to a memory storagedisk.

In an embodiment, a universal serial bus (USB) drive is disclosed. Theuniversal serial bus drive comprises a memory, wherein the memorycontains at least some confidential information, a processor coupled tothe memory, a universal serial bus connector coupled to the processor,and an application stored in the memory. When executed by the processor,the application determines that a request to access the memory receivedby the universal serial bus connector is directed to the confidentialinformation, and, when a message is received by the connector from thesender of the request to access memory that indicates that the sender isexecuting in a trusted security zone, satisfies the request to accessthe memory. When no message is received by the connector from the senderof the request to access memory that indicates that the sender isexecuting in a trusted security zone, the application does not satisfythe request to access the memory.

In an embodiment, a method of accessing a memory disk drive isdisclosed. The method comprises transmitting to a disk controller of amemory disk drive a command to execute in a trusted security zone of thedisk controller, transmitting to the disk controller a request forconfirmation that the disk controller is executing in the trustedsecurity zone of the disk controller, and when a confirmation that thedisk controller is executing in the trusted security zone of the diskcontroller is received, transmitting to the disk controller a command toaccess a trusted security zone portion of the memory disk drive.

These and other features will be more clearly understood from thefollowing detailed description taken in conjunction with theaccompanying drawings and claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the present disclosure, referenceis now made to the following brief description, taken in connection withthe accompanying drawings and detailed description, wherein likereference numerals represent like parts.

FIG. 1 is an illustration of a system according to an embodiment of thedisclosure.

FIG. 2A is an illustration of a universal serial bus (USB) driveaccording to an embodiment of the disclosure.

FIG. 2B is an illustration of another universal serial bus driveaccording to an embodiment of the disclosure.

FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of thedisclosure.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of another method according to an embodiment ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 5 is an illustration of a mobile phone according to an embodimentof the disclosure.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a mobile phone according to an embodimentof the disclosure.

FIG. 7A is an illustration of a software architecture of a mobile phoneaccording to an embodiment of the disclosure.

FIG. 7B is an illustration of another software architecture of a mobilephone according to an embodiment of the disclosure.

FIG. 8 is an illustration of a computer system according to anembodiment of the disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

It should be understood at the outset that although illustrativeimplementations of one or more embodiments are illustrated below, thedisclosed systems and methods may be implemented using any number oftechniques, whether currently known or not yet in existence. Thedisclosure should in no way be limited to the illustrativeimplementations, drawings, and techniques illustrated below, but may bemodified within the scope of the appended claims along with their fullscope of equivalents.

In an embodiment, systems and methods for trusted communication withperipheral devices and/or peripheral controllers is disclosed. In atypical computer system, logic executes not only on a central processorbut in peripheral devices such as a port controller, a disk controller,a radio transceiver, and other devices. The peripheral devices maycomprise microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSPs), applicationspecific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable logic arrays(FPGAs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), or other logicprocessors. As such, malware that may have been infiltrated into theexecutable logic of these peripheral devices may be able to monitor orsniff confidential information as it passes on a data bus of thecomputer system, though the subject peripheral device may not have beenaddressed and/or commanded to read the subject confidential information.Malware in a peripheral device may be able to access confidentialinformation stored in a memory of the computer system. Confidentialinformation may comprise credit card account numbers, credit cardauthentication numbers, personal data, medical data, and otherinformation.

The present disclosure teaches transferring confidential informationbetween two trusted logic processors, thereby providing a continuity oftrust, while at the same time capturing or locking out other peripheraldevices and thereby preventing them from potentially monitoring orsniffing the confidential information as it is transmitted on the databus. This state of the computer system may be referred to as a trustedmode of operation. In an embodiment, a logic processor of a peripheraldevice that is not a party to the trusted communication is commanded toexecute in a trusted security zone of the logic processor of theperipheral device, and while executing in its trusted security zone thelogic processor of the peripheral executes a trusted routine or programthat performs no substantive processing and does not read the data bus.The logic processors that are engaged in transmitting the confidentialinformation may both execute trusted communication applications orprograms in a trusted security zone of each of the logic processors.When executing in the trusted security zone, each of these logicprocessors pause or idle any other normal applications or programs thatwere active. When the confidential information has been transported overthe data bus, the logic processor of the peripheral device and the othercommunication party may be commanded to execute in a normal securityzone of the logic processor, thereby resuming normal processing. Thelogic processors of the other peripheral controllers and/or devicecontrollers may likewise be commanded to resume executing in the normalsecurity zone.

A universal serial bus (USB) drive may be plugged into a USB port of thecomputer system, and a central processing unit of the computer systemmay attempt to read confidential information from the USB drive. The USBdrive may execute logic in a processor that delays providing access tothe confidential information to the central processing unit until thecentral processing unit sends a trust token to the USB drive thatconfirms that the central processing unit is executing in a trustedsecurity zone. The processor in the USB drive may execute in a trustedsecurity zone or may execute in a normal security zone, for example whenthe processor of the USB does not comprise a trusted security zone.

A disk drive controller may mediate access to a disk drive. The diskdrive may have a normal memory area and a trusted memory area. The diskdrive controller may have a trusted security zone, and the trustedmemory area may be known only to the trusted security zone or may beaccessible only from the trusted security zone. In an embodiment, diskmemory may be flagged as trusted memory space, and the disk drivecontroller may begin executing in the trusted security zone when memorythat is flagged as trusted is accessed.

A trusted security zone provides chipsets with a hardware root of trust,a secure execution environment for applications, and secure access toperipherals. A hardware root of trust means the chipset should onlyexecute programs intended by the device manufacturer or vendor andresists software and physical attacks, and therefore remains trusted toprovide the intended level of security. The chipset architecture isdesigned to promote a programmable environment that allows theconfidentiality and integrity of assets to be protected from specificattacks. Trusted security zone capabilities are becoming features inboth wireless and fixed hardware architecture designs. Providing thetrusted security zone in the main mobile device chipset and protectingthe hardware root of trust removes the need for separate secure hardwareto authenticate the device or user. To ensure the integrity of theapplications requiring trusted data, such as a mobile financial servicesapplication, the trusted security zone also provides the secureexecution environment where only trusted applications can operate, safefrom attacks. Security is further promoted by restricting access ofnon-trusted applications to peripherals, such as data inputs and dataoutputs, while a trusted application is running in the secure executionenvironment. In an embodiment, the trusted security zone may beconceptualized as hardware assisted security.

A complete trusted execution environment (TEE) may be implementedthrough the use of the trusted security zone hardware and softwarearchitecture. The trusted execution environment is an executionenvironment that is parallel to the execution environment of the mainmobile device operating system. The trusted execution environment and/orthe trusted security zone may provide a base layer of functionalityand/or utilities for use of applications that may execute in the trustedsecurity zone. For example, in an embodiment, trust tokens may begenerated by the base layer of functionality and/or utilities of thetrusted execution environment and/or trusted security zone for use intrusted end-to-end communication links to document a continuity of trustof the communications. For more details on establishing trustedend-to-end communication links relying on hardware assisted security,see U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/532,588, filed Jun. 25, 2012,entitled “End-to-end Trusted Communications Infrastructure,” by LeoMichael McRoberts, et al., which is hereby incorporated by reference inits entirety. Through standardization of application programminginterfaces (APIs), the trusted execution environment becomes a place towhich scalable deployment of secure services can be targeted. A devicewhich has a chipset that has a trusted execution environment on it mayexist in a trusted services environment, where devices in the trustedservices environment are trusted and protected against attacks. Thetrusted execution environment can be implemented on mobile phones andtablets as well as extending to other trusted devices such as personalcomputers, servers, sensors, medical devices, point-of-sale terminals,industrial automation, handheld terminals, automotive, etc.

The trusted security zone is implemented by partitioning all of thehardware and software resources of the mobile device into twopartitions: a secure partition and a normal partition. Placing sensitiveresources in the secure partition can protect against possible attackson those resources. For example, resources such as trusted softwareapplications may run in the secure partition and have access to hardwareperipherals such as a touchscreen or a secure location in memory. Lesssecure peripherals such as wireless radios may be disabled completelywhile the secure partition is being accessed, while other peripheralsmay only be accessed from the secure partition. While the securepartition is being accessed through the trusted execution environment,the main mobile operating system in the normal partition is suspended,and applications in the normal partition are prevented from accessingthe secure peripherals and data. This prevents corrupted applications ormalware applications from breaking the trust of the device.

The trusted security zone is implemented by partitioning the hardwareand software resources to exist in a secure subsystem which is notaccessible to components outside the secure subsystem. The trustedsecurity zone is built into the processor architecture at the time ofmanufacture through hardware logic present in the trusted security zonewhich enables a perimeter boundary between the secure partition and thenormal partition. The trusted security zone may only be manipulated bythose with the proper credential and, in an embodiment, may not be addedto the chip after it is manufactured. Software architecture to supportthe secure partition may be provided through a dedicated secure kernelrunning trusted applications. Trusted applications are independentsecure applications which can be accessed by normal applications throughan application programming interface in the trusted executionenvironment on a chipset that utilizes the trusted security zone.

In an embodiment, the normal partition applications run on a firstvirtual processor, and the secure partition applications run on a secondvirtual processor. Both virtual processors may run on a single physicalprocessor, executing in a time-sliced fashion, removing the need for adedicated physical security processor. Time-sliced execution comprisesswitching contexts between the two virtual processors to share processorresources based on tightly controlled mechanisms such as secure softwareinstructions or hardware exceptions. The context of the currentlyrunning virtual processor is saved, the context of the virtual processorbeing switched to is restored, and processing is restarted in therestored virtual processor. Time-sliced execution protects the trustedsecurity zone by stopping the execution of the normal partition whilethe secure partition is executing.

The two virtual processors context switch via a processor mode calledmonitor mode when changing the currently running virtual processor. Themechanisms by which the processor can enter monitor mode from the normalpartition are tightly controlled. The entry to monitor mode can betriggered by software executing a dedicated instruction, the SecureMonitor Call (SMC) instruction, or by a subset of the hardware exceptionmechanisms such as hardware interrupts, which can be configured to causethe processor to switch into monitor mode. The software that executeswithin monitor mode then saves the context of the running virtualprocessor and switches to the secure virtual processor.

The trusted security zone runs a separate operating system that is notaccessible to the device users. For security purposes, the trustedsecurity zone is not open to users for installing applications, whichmeans users do not have access to install applications in the trustedsecurity zone. This prevents corrupted applications or malwareapplications from executing powerful instructions reserved to thetrusted security zone and thus preserves the trust of the device. Thesecurity of the system is achieved at least in part by partitioning thehardware and software resources of the mobile phone so they exist in oneof two partitions, the secure partition for the security subsystem andthe normal partition for everything else. Placing the trusted securityzone in the secure partition and restricting access from the normalpartition protects against software and basic hardware attacks. Hardwarelogic ensures that no secure partition resources can be accessed by thenormal partition components or applications. A dedicated securepartition operating system runs in a virtual processor separate from thenormal partition operating system that likewise executes in its ownvirtual processor. Users may install applications on the mobile devicewhich may execute in the normal partition operating system describedabove. The trusted security zone runs a separate operating system forthe secure partition that is installed by the mobile device manufactureror vendor, and users are not able to install new applications in oralter the contents of the trusted security zone.

Turning now to FIG. 1, a system 100 is described. In an embodiment, thesystem 100 comprises a central processing unit (CPU) 102, a memory 104,a keyboard controller 106, a display controller 108, a disk controller110, a universal serial bus (USB) port controller 112, an Ethernet portcontroller 114, and a radio transceiver 116. The system 100 furthercomprises a data bus 118 and an address bus 120. The system 100 maycomprise other components and/or communication pathways not shown. Forexample, the system 100 may comprise a variety of control lines or acontrol bus that is not shown. In an embodiment, commands and/or controlsignals may be carried on the data bus 118.

In an embodiment, the system 100 implements a computer system, forexample a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, aserver computer, a database server computer, or other computer. Someaspects of computer systems are described towards the end of thisspecification. While not inconsistent with the description of computersystems at the end of the specification, the depiction of the system 100in FIG. 1 is convenient for discussing some aspects of the embodimentsof the disclosure. The system 100 may also be embodied as a mobiledevice such as a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), amedia player, and other portable devices that have a radio frequencycommunication capabilty. In an embodiment, the system 100 may notcomprise the disk controller 110 or the Ethernet port controller 114.

The memory 104 may be any of a variety of semi-conductor memory such asread only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), flash memory, staticrandom access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), andthe like. The system 100 may also access disk memory (not shown) via thedisk controller 110. In an embodiment, access to the memory 104 may bemediated by a memory controller (not shown). The memory controller mayexecute software and/or firmware instructions in a logic processor.Alternatively, in another embodiment, the memory 104 may be accessedfrom the address bus 120 and the data bus 118 without mediation providedby a memory controller.

The keyboard controller 106 may receive input from a traditionalkeyboard or from a touch input device, such as a touch screen device.The keyboard controller 106, or another controller, may also receiveinput from a microphone. The keyboard controller 106 may de-bounce thekeys of the keyboard, buffer user input when the buses 118, 120 arebusy, send the input from the keyboard on the data bus 118 to the CPU102, and provide other mediating services. The display controller 108may receive output from the CPU 102 and send the output to a visualdisplay in such a way as to present the output on the visual display.The disk controller 110 may mediate requests to read from and to writeto a disk drive (not shown). The USB port controller 112 may mediaterequests to read from and to write to a USB drive. The Ethernet portcontroller 114 may mediate requests to read from and to write to anEthernet communication link. The radio transceiver 116 may comprise alogic processor that modulates and demodulates signals. The radiotransceiver 116 may further comprise radio components for upconverting amodulated signal to a radio frequency signal, amplifiying the radiofrequency signal, and transmitting the radio frequency signal via anantenna (not shown) as well as for receiving a radio frequency signalvia the antenna, amplifying the received radio frequency signal, anddownconverting the radio frequency signal to a baseband signal. As isknown to one skilled in the art, the radio transceiver 116 may provide avariety of further signal processing functions. In an embodiment, eachof the controllers 106, 108, 110, 112, 114 and the radio transceiver 116may execute software and/or firmware instructions in a logic processorsuch as a microprocessor, a digital signal processor, an applicationspecific integrated circuit, a field programmable logic array, a complexprogrammable logic device, or other logic processors.

The CPU 102 may be considered to manage or control the memory 104, thecontrollers 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, and the radio transceiver 116 bysending control signals. The CPU 102 may be implemented as a logicprocessor, for example a microprocessor, a digital signal processor,and/or another logic processor. The CPU 102 executes one or moresoftware or firmware applications to provide the desired functionalityof the system 100. The CPU 102 may select devices by addressing them onthe address bus 120. The CPU 102 may read from or write to devices onthe data bus 118. Some of the data transmitted or received may compriseconfidential information that is desired to be processed using acontinuity of trust. A continuity of trust may be considered to beprovided when the CPU 102 executes in a trusted security zone and writesto or reads from a peripheral device that likewise executes in a trustedsecurity zone of the device, for example, in a trusted security zone ofone of the controllers 106, 108, 110, 112, 114 or of the radiotransceiver 116.

As an example, the CPU 102 may execute a disk drive reading routine in atrusted security zone of the CPU 102, may command the controllers 106,108, 112, 114 and the radio transceiver 116 to execute in a trustedsecurity zone of their respective logic processors and to execute anidling program, and may command the disk controller 110 to execute adisk access routine in a trusted security zone of the logic processor ofthe disk controller 110. While the controllers 106, 108, 112, 114 andthe radio transceiver 116 execute the idling program, they do not readfrom or write to the data bus 118. Additionally, in an embodiment,untrusted applications are not allowed to execute on the controllers106, 108, 110, 112, 114 or on the radio transceiver 116 while they areexecuting in the trusted security zone. Under this condition, which maybe referred to as a trusted mode of operation, the CPU 102 may send arequest to read the data from a specific address or range of addressesof the disk drive.

The disk controller 110 may receive the request from the CPU 102 andverify that the CPU 102 is executing in the trusted security zone, asindicated by a trust token sent by the CPU 102 to the disk controller110. The disk controller 110 may then retrieve the requested data whileexecuting a trusted routine in its trusted security zone and transmitthis requested data over the data bus 118. After the data has beentransmitted, the trusted security mode of operation may be terminated,and the CPU 102, the controllers 106, 108, 110, 112, 114 and the radiotransceiver 116 may return to executing in the normal security zone oftheir respective logic processors.

In an embodiment, data stored on the disk coupled to the disk controller110 may comprise a trusted/untrusted flag to designate the trust statusof the subject unit of data. When the CPU 102 requests to access thedata, the disk controller 110 may first read the trust flag, it mayidentify that the addressed data is trusted data. The disk controller110 may then execute in its trusted security zone and may send a messageto the CPU 102 asking that it enter the trusted security zone tocomplete disk access.

Turning now to FIG. 2A, a first universal serial bus (USB) drive 130 isdescribed. In an embodiment, the first USB drive 130 comprises aprocessor 132, a memory 134, and a universal serial bus connector 136.In some contexts, the first USB drive 130 may be referred to as a thumbdrive. The first USB drive 130 may be easily portable and inexpensive.The memory 134 may comprise any kind of readable and writeable randomaccess memory.

In an embodiment, the first USB drive 130 may be connected to the system100 and/or the USB port controller 112 by the USB connector 136. Thefirst USB drive 130 may store confidential information that it isdesired to be read from or written to the memory 134, for example by theCPU 102. The processor 132 may determine that the CPU 102 is attemptingto write confidential information to or to read confidential informationfrom the memory 134. In this case, the processor 132 may delayperforming the requested access to the memory 134 until the CPU 102sends a trust token indicating that the system 100 has entered thetrusted operation mode. In an embodiment, the processor 132 may send amessage to the CPU 102 requesting that the system 100 enter the trustedoperation mode. When the processor 132 determines the CPU 102 isattempting to write to or read from an area of the memory 134 that doesnot contain confidential information, the processor 132 may satisfy thememory access request without expecting the system 100 to enter atrusted operation mode. The confidential information may comprise acredit card account number, a credit card authentication number, afinancial account number, a financial account authentication number, asocial security number, a telephone number, personal data, medical data,or other information.

Turning now to FIG. 2B, a second USB drive 140 is described. In anembodiment, the second USB drive 140 comprises a processor 142 having atrusted security zone 144, the memory 146, and a universal serial busconnector 148. The second USB drive 140 is substantially similar to thefirst USB drive 130, with the difference that the processor 142 furthercomprises the trusted security zone 144. In an embodiment, when thesecond USB drive 140 detects that the system 100 is attempting to accessthe confidential information stored in the memory 146, the processor 142begins executing the trusted security zone 144. The trusted securityzone 144 may wait for the system 100 to send an indication via the USBport controller 112 that the system 100 is in the trusted operation modeand or send a message to the USB port controller 112 to request thesystem 100 to go into the trusted operation mode before handing requeststo access the confidential information in the memory 146.

Turning now to FIG. 3, a method 200 is described. At block 202, a datacommunication application is executed in a trusted security zone of aprocessor, wherein the processor is a component of a computer. At block204, a controller of a first peripheral device is commanded to execute acontrol application in a trusted security zone of the controller,wherein the controller of the first peripheral device is a component ofthe computer. This block may comprise sending a trusted flag or otherindication that the trusted mode of operation should be entered, by theprocessor to the controller. Of the first peripheral device. At block206, at least one of another peripheral device or a user interfacedevice is commanded to not access a data bus of the computer. At block208, it is verified that the controller of the first peripheral deviceis executing the control application in the trusted security zone of thecontroller.

At block 210, after verifying that the controller of the firstperipheral device is executing the control application in the trustedsecurity zone of the controller, data is sent from the processor to thecontroller of the first peripheral device over the data bus of thecomputer. At block 212, the controller of the first peripheral deviceone of transmits the data sent by the processor on an externalcommunication link, reading a memory storage disk, or writing to amemory storage disk.

Turning now to FIG. 4, a method 220 is described. At block 222, acommand to execute in a trusted security zone of a disk controller istransmitted to the disk controller. At block 224, a request forconfirmation that the disk controller is executing in the trustedsecurity zone of the disk controller is transmitted to the diskcontroller. At block 226, when a confirmation that the disk controlleris executing in the trusted security zone of the disk controller isreceived, transmit to the disk controller a command to access a trustedsecurity zone portion of the memory disk drive.

FIG. 5 depicts a mobile device 400, which is operable for implementingaspects of the present disclosure, but the present disclosure should notbe limited to these implementations. Though illustrated as a mobilephone, the mobile device 400 may take various forms including a wirelesshandset, a pager, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a gaming device,or a media player. The mobile device 400 includes a display 402 and atouch-sensitive surface and/or keys 404 for input by a user. The mobiledevice 400 may present options for the user to select, controls for theuser to actuate, and/or cursors or other indicators for the user todirect. The mobile device 400 may further accept data entry from theuser, including numbers to dial or various parameter values forconfiguring the operation of the handset. The mobile device 400 mayfurther execute one or more software or firmware applications inresponse to user commands. These applications may configure the mobiledevice 400 to perform various customized functions in response to userinteraction. Additionally, the mobile device 400 may be programmedand/or configured over-the-air, for example from a wireless basestation, a wireless access point, or a peer mobile device 400. Themobile device 400 may execute a web browser application which enablesthe display 402 to show a web page. The web page may be obtained viawireless communications with a base transceiver station, a wirelessnetwork access node, a peer mobile device 400 or any other wirelesscommunication network or system.

FIG. 6 shows a block diagram of the mobile device 400. While a varietyof known components of handsets are depicted, in an embodiment a subsetof the listed components and/or additional components not listed may beincluded in the mobile device 400. The mobile device 400 includes adigital signal processor (DSP) 502 and a memory 504. As shown, themobile device 400 may further include an antenna and front end unit 506,a radio frequency (RF) transceiver 508, a baseband processing unit 510,a microphone 512, an earpiece speaker 514, a headset port 516, aninput/output interface 518, a removable memory card 520, a universalserial bus (USB) port 522, an infrared port 524, a vibrator 526, akeypad 528, a touch screen liquid crystal display (LCD) with a touchsensitive surface 530, a touch screen/LCD controller 532, a camera 534,a camera controller 536, and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver538. In an embodiment, the mobile device 400 may include another kind ofdisplay that does not provide a touch sensitive screen. In anembodiment, the DSP 502 may communicate directly with the memory 504without passing through the input/output interface 518. Additionally, inan embodiment, the mobile device 400 may comprise other peripheraldevices that provide other functionality.

The DSP 502 or some other form of controller or central processing unitoperates to control the various components of the mobile device 400 inaccordance with embedded software or firmware stored in memory 504 orstored in memory contained within the DSP 502 itself. In addition to theembedded software or firmware, the DSP 502 may execute otherapplications stored in the memory 504 or made available via informationcarrier media such as portable data storage media like the removablememory card 520 or via wired or wireless network communications. Theapplication software may comprise a compiled set of machine-readableinstructions that configure the DSP 502 to provide the desiredfunctionality, or the application software may be high-level softwareinstructions to be processed by an interpreter or compiler to indirectlyconfigure the DSP 502.

The DSP 502 may communicate with a wireless network via the analogbaseband processing unit 510. In some embodiments, the communication mayprovide Internet connectivity, enabling a user to gain access to contenton the Internet and to send and receive e-mail or text messages. Theinput/output interface 518 interconnects the DSP 502 and variousmemories and interfaces. The memory 504 and the removable memory card520 may provide software and data to configure the operation of the DSP502. Among the interfaces may be the USB port 522 and the infrared port524. The USB port 522 may enable the mobile device 400 to function as aperipheral device to exchange information with a personal computer orother computer system. The infrared port 524 and other optional portssuch as a Bluetooth interface or an IEEE 802.11 compliant wirelessinterface may enable the mobile device 400 to communicate wirelesslywith other nearby handsets and/or wireless base stations.

The keypad 528 couples to the DSP 502 via the interface 518 to provideone mechanism for the user to make selections, enter information, andotherwise provide input to the mobile device 400. Another inputmechanism may be the touch screen LCD 530, which may also display textand/or graphics to the user. The touch screen LCD controller 532 couplesthe DSP 502 to the touch screen LCD 530. The GPS receiver 538 is coupledto the DSP 502 to decode global positioning system signals, therebyenabling the mobile device 400 to determine its position.

FIG. 7A illustrates a software environment 602 that may be implementedby the DSP 502. The DSP 502 executes operating system software 604 thatprovides a platform from which the rest of the software operates. Theoperating system software 604 may provide a variety of drivers for thehandset hardware with standardized interfaces that are accessible toapplication software. The operating system software 604 may be coupledto and interact with application management services (AMS) 606 thattransfer control between applications running on the mobile device 400.Also shown in FIG. 7A are a web browser application 608, a media playerapplication 610, and JAVA applets 612. The web browser application 608may be executed by the mobile device 400 to browse content and/or theInternet, for example when the mobile device 400 is coupled to a networkvia a wireless link. The web browser application 608 may permit a userto enter information into forms and select links to retrieve and viewweb pages. The media player application 610 may be executed by themobile device 400 to play audio or audiovisual media. The JAVA applets612 may be executed by the mobile device 400 to provide a variety offunctionality including games, utilities, and other functionality.

FIG. 7B illustrates an alternative software environment 620 that may beimplemented by the DSP 502. The DSP 502 executes operating systemsoftware 628 and an execution runtime 630. The DSP 502 executesapplications 622 that may execute in the execution runtime 630 and mayrely upon services provided by the application framework 624.Applications 622 and the application framework 624 may rely uponfunctionality provided via the libraries 626.

FIG. 8 illustrates a computer system 380 suitable for implementing oneor more embodiments disclosed herein. The computer system 380 includes aprocessor 382 (which may be referred to as a central processor unit orCPU) that is in communication with memory devices including secondarystorage 384, read only memory (ROM) 386, random access memory (RAM) 388,input/output (I/O) devices 390, and network connectivity devices 392.The processor 382 may be implemented as one or more CPU chips.

It is understood that by programming and/or loading executableinstructions onto the computer system 380, at least one of the CPU 382,the RAM 388, and the ROM 386 are changed, transforming the computersystem 380 in part into a particular machine or apparatus having thenovel functionality taught by the present disclosure. It is fundamentalto the electrical engineering and software engineering arts thatfunctionality that can be implemented by loading executable softwareinto a computer can be converted to a hardware implementation by wellknown design rules. Decisions between implementing a concept in softwareversus hardware typically hinge on considerations of stability of thedesign and numbers of units to be produced rather than any issuesinvolved in translating from the software domain to the hardware domain.Generally, a design that is still subject to frequent change may bepreferred to be implemented in software, because re-spinning a hardwareimplementation is more expensive than re-spinning a software design.Generally, a design that is stable that will be produced in large volumemay be preferred to be implemented in hardware, for example in anapplication specific integrated circuit (ASIC), because for largeproduction runs the hardware implementation may be less expensive thanthe software implementation. Often a design may be developed and testedin a software form and later transformed, by well known design rules, toan equivalent hardware implementation in an application specificintegrated circuit that hardwires the instructions of the software. Inthe same manner as a machine controlled by a new ASIC is a particularmachine or apparatus, likewise a computer that has been programmedand/or loaded with executable instructions may be viewed as a particularmachine or apparatus.

The secondary storage 384 is typically comprised of one or more diskdrives or tape drives and is used for non-volatile storage of data andas an over-flow data storage device if RAM 388 is not large enough tohold all working data. Secondary storage 384 may be used to storeprograms which are loaded into RAM 388 when such programs are selectedfor execution. The ROM 386 is used to store instructions and perhapsdata which are read during program execution. ROM 386 is a non-volatilememory device which typically has a small memory capacity relative tothe larger memory capacity of secondary storage 384. The RAM 388 is usedto store volatile data and perhaps to store instructions. Access to bothROM 386 and RAM 388 is typically faster than to secondary storage 384.The secondary storage 384, the RAM 388, and/or the ROM 386 may bereferred to in some contexts as computer readable storage media and/ornon-transitory computer readable media.

I/O devices 390 may include printers, video monitors, liquid crystaldisplays (LCDs), touch screen displays, keyboards, keypads, switches,dials, mice, track balls, voice recognizers, card readers, paper tapereaders, or other well-known input devices.

The network connectivity devices 392 may take the form of modems, modembanks, Ethernet cards, universal serial bus (USB) interface cards,serial interfaces, token ring cards, fiber distributed data interface(FDDI) cards, wireless local area network (WLAN) cards, radiotransceiver cards such as code division multiple access (CDMA), globalsystem for mobile communications (GSM), long-term evolution (LTE),worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX), and/or otherair interface protocol radio transceiver cards, and other well-knownnetwork devices. These network connectivity devices 392 may enable theprocessor 382 to communicate with the Internet or one or more intranets.With such a network connection, it is contemplated that the processor382 might receive information from the network, or might outputinformation to the network in the course of performing theabove-described method steps. Such information, which is oftenrepresented as a sequence of instructions to be executed using processor382, may be received from and outputted to the network, for example, inthe form of a computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave.

Such information, which may include data or instructions to be executedusing processor 382 for example, may be received from and outputted tothe network, for example, in the form of a computer data baseband signalor signal embodied in a carrier wave. The baseband signal or signalembedded in the carrier wave, or other types of signals currently usedor hereafter developed, may be generated according to several methodswell known to one skilled in the art. The baseband signal and/or signalembedded in the carrier wave may be referred to in some contexts as atransitory signal.

The processor 382 executes instructions, codes, computer programs,scripts which it accesses from hard disk, floppy disk, optical disk(these various disk based systems may all be considered secondarystorage 384), ROM 386, RAM 388, or the network connectivity devices 392.While only one processor 382 is shown, multiple processors may bepresent. Thus, while instructions may be discussed as executed by aprocessor, the instructions may be executed simultaneously, serially, orotherwise executed by one or multiple processors. Instructions, codes,computer programs, scripts, and/or data that may be accessed from thesecondary storage 384, for example, hard drives, floppy disks, opticaldisks, and/or other device, the ROM 386, and/or the RAM 388 may bereferred to in some contexts as non-transitory instructions and/ornon-transitory information.

In an embodiment, the computer system 380 may comprise two or morecomputers in communication with each other that collaborate to perform atask. For example, but not by way of limitation, an application may bepartitioned in such a way as to permit concurrent and/or parallelprocessing of the instructions of the application. Alternatively, thedata processed by the application may be partitioned in such a way as topermit concurrent and/or parallel processing of different portions of adata set by the two or more computers. In an embodiment, virtualizationsoftware may be employed by the computer system 380 to provide thefunctionality of a number of servers that is not directly bound to thenumber of computers in the computer system 380. For example,virtualization software may provide twenty virtual servers on fourphysical computers. In an embodiment, the functionality disclosed abovemay be provided by executing the application and/or applications in acloud computing environment. Cloud computing may comprise providingcomputing services via a network connection using dynamically scalablecomputing resources. Cloud computing may be supported, at least in part,by virtualization software. A cloud computing environment may beestablished by an enterprise and/or may be hired on an as-needed basisfrom a third party provider. Some cloud computing environments maycomprise cloud computing resources owned and operated by the enterpriseas well as cloud computing resources hired and/or leased from a thirdparty provider.

In an embodiment, some or all of the functionality disclosed above maybe provided as a computer program product. The computer program productmay comprise one or more computer readable storage medium havingcomputer usable program code embodied therein to implement thefunctionality disclosed above. The computer program product may comprisedata structures, executable instructions, and other computer usableprogram code. The computer program product may be embodied in removablecomputer storage media and/or non-removable computer storage media. Theremovable computer readable storage medium may comprise, withoutlimitation, a paper tape, a magnetic tape, magnetic disk, an opticaldisk, a solid state memory chip, for example analog magnetic tape,compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) disks, floppy disks, jump drives,digital cards, multimedia cards, and others. The computer programproduct may be suitable for loading, by the computer system 380, atleast portions of the contents of the computer program product to thesecondary storage 384, to the ROM 386, to the RAM 388, and/or to othernon-volatile memory and volatile memory of the computer system 380. Theprocessor 382 may process the executable instructions and/or datastructures in part by directly accessing the computer program product,for example by reading from a CD-ROM disk inserted into a disk driveperipheral of the computer system 380. Alternatively, the processor 382may process the executable instructions and/or data structures byremotely accessing the computer program product, for example bydownloading the executable instructions and/or data structures from aremote server through the network connectivity devices 392. The computerprogram product may comprise instructions that promote the loadingand/or copying of data, data structures, files, and/or executableinstructions to the secondary storage 384, to the ROM 386, to the RAM388, and/or to other non-volatile memory and volatile memory of thecomputer system 380.

In some contexts, the secondary storage 384, the ROM 386, and the RAM388 may be referred to as a non-transitory computer readable medium or acomputer readable storage media. A dynamic RAM embodiment of the RAM388, likewise, may be referred to as a non-transitory computer readablemedium in that while the dynamic RAM receives electrical power and isoperated in accordance with its design, for example during a period oftime during which the computer 380 is turned on and operational, thedynamic RAM stores information that is written to it. Similarly, theprocessor 382 may comprise an internal RAM, an internal ROM, a cachememory, and/or other internal non-transitory storage blocks, sections,or components that may be referred to in some contexts as non-transitorycomputer readable media or computer readable storage media.

While several embodiments have been provided in the present disclosure,it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods may beembodied in many other specific forms without departing from the spiritor scope of the present disclosure. The present examples are to beconsidered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the intention is notto be limited to the details given herein. For example, the variouselements or components may be combined or integrated in another systemor certain features may be omitted or not implemented.

Also, techniques, systems, subsystems, and methods described andillustrated in the various embodiments as discrete or separate may becombined or integrated with other systems, modules, techniques, ormethods without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.Other items shown or discussed as directly coupled or communicating witheach other may be indirectly coupled or communicating through someinterface, device, or intermediate component, whether electrically,mechanically, or otherwise. Other examples of changes, substitutions,and alterations are ascertainable by one skilled in the art and could bemade without departing from the spirit and scope disclosed herein.

1. A method of trusted data communication, comprising: executing, by acomputer, a data communication application in a trusted security zone ofa processor, wherein the processor is a component of the computer;commanding, by the computer, a controller of a trusted peripheral deviceto execute a control application in a trusted security zone of thecontroller, wherein the controller of the trusted peripheral device is acomponent of the computer, and wherein the trusted peripheral device isa party to a trusted data communication; commanding, by the computer, atleast one of another peripheral device or a user interface device to notaccess a data bus of the computer and to execute an idling program toidle active applications or programs while the controller of the trustedperipheral device is executing the control application in the trustedsecurity zone of the controller, wherein the at least one of the otherperipheral device or the user interface does not read from or write tothe data bus while executing the idling program, and wherein the atleast one of the other peripheral device or the user interface device isnot a party to the trusted data communication; verifying, by thecomputer, that the controller of the trusted peripheral device isexecuting the control application in the trusted security zone of thecontroller; and sending, by the computer, data from the processor to thecontroller of the trusted peripheral device over the data bus of thecomputer after verifying that the controller of the trusted peripheraldevice is executing the control application in the trusted security zoneof the controller; wherein the controller of the trusted peripheraldevice performs at least one of transmitting the data sent by theprocessor on an external communication link, reading a memory storagedisk, or writing to a memory storage disk.
 2. The method of claim 1,wherein the trusted peripheral device is a universal serial bus (USB)port.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the trusted peripheral device isan Ethernet port.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the trustedperipheral device is a memory disk drive controller.
 5. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the user interface device is one of a keyboard, adisplay, a touchscreen, or a microphone.
 6. The method of claim 1,wherein commanding the controller of the trusted peripheral device toexecute the control application in the trusted security zone of thecontroller is performed by sending a trusted flag in a message by theprocessor to the controller of the trusted peripheral device.
 7. Asystem for trusted communication, comprising: a universal serial busdrive coupled to a data bus, the universal serial bus drive comprising:a memory, wherein the memory contains at least some confidentialinformation, a processor coupled to the memory, a universal serial busconnector coupled to the processor, and an application stored in thememory that, when executed by the processor, determines that a requestto access the memory received by the universal serial bus connector isdirected to the at least some confidential information, satisfies therequest to access the memory when a message, received by the universalserial bus connector from a sender of the request to access the memory,indicates that the sender is executing in a trusted security zone, anddoes not satisfy the request to access the memory when the message isnot received by the universal series bus connector from the sender; andat least one of a peripheral device or a user interface device coupledto the data bus, wherein the at least one of the peripheral device orthe user interface device is commanded to not access the data bus and toexecute an idling program to idle active applications or programs whilethe application satisfies the request to access the memory, wherein theat least one of the peripheral device or the user interface does notread from or write to the data bus while executing the idling program,and wherein the at least one of the peripheral device or the userinterface device is not a party to a trusted data communication.
 8. Thesystem of claim 7, wherein the at least some confidential informationcomprises at least one of a credit card number, a credit cardauthentication number, a financial account number, a financial accountauthentication number, a social security number, or a telephone number.9. The system of claim 7, wherein the processor comprises a trustedsecurity zone and wherein the application executes in the trustedsecurity zone of the processor.
 10. The system of claim 9, wherein theat least some confidential information is stored in a trusted securityzone of the memory.
 11. The system of claim 9, wherein the applicationexecutes in the trusted security zone of the processor based on therequest.
 12. The system of claim 11, wherein the request indicates thatthe request is to be processed by the trusted security zone of theprocessor.
 13. The system of claim 7, wherein the application sends anexecution request to the sender to execute in the trusted security zoneof the sender.
 14. A method of accessing a memory disk drive,comprising: transmitting, by a computer to a disk controller of a memorydisk drive, a command to execute in a trusted security zone of the diskcontroller; transmitting, by the computer to the disk controller, arequest for confirmation that the disk controller is executing in thetrusted security zone of the disk controller; when a confirmation thatthe disk controller is executing in the trusted security zone of thedisk controller is received, transmitting, by the computer to the diskcontroller, a command to access a trusted security zone portion of thememory disk drive; and commanding, by the computer, at least one ofanother peripheral device or a user interface device to not access adata bus of the computer and to execute an idling program to idle activeapplications or programs while the disk controller accesses the trustedsecurity portion of the memory disk drive, wherein the at least one ofthe peripheral device or the user interface does not read from or writeto the data bus while executing the idling program, and wherein the atleast one of the peripheral device or the user interface device is not aparty to a trusted data communication.
 15. The method of claim 14,wherein a server computer transmits the command to the memory disk driveto execute in the trusted security zone of the disk controller.
 16. Themethod of claim 14, wherein the confirmation comprises a trust token.17. The method of claim 14, wherein the memory disk drive is installedin one of a desk top computer, a laptop computer, or a notebookcomputer.
 18. The method of claim 14, wherein the memory disk drivefurther comprises a normal security portion.
 19. The method of claim 14,wherein the trusted security zone of the disk controller comprises aseparate physical portion of the disk controller.
 20. The method ofclaim 14, wherein the trusted security zone of the disk controllercomprises a virtual processor portion of the disk controller.